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A Comparison of Two Hybrid Methods
for Analyzing Evidential Reasoning
Ludi VAN LEEUWEN, Bart VERHEIJ
Department of Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Bernoulli Institute of Mathematics,
Computer Science and Artiﬁcial Intelligence, University of Groningen
Abstract. Reasoning with evidence is error prone, especially when qualitative and
quantitative evidence is combined, as shown by infamous miscarriages of justice,
such as the Lucia de Berk case in the Netherlands. Methods for the rational analysis
of evidential reasoning come in different kinds, often with arguments, scenarios
and probabilities as primitives. Recently various combinations of argumentative,
narrative and probabilistic methods have been investigated. By the complexity and
subtlety of the subject matter, it has proven hard to assess the speciﬁc strengths
and points of attention of different methods. Comparative case studies have only
recently started, and never by one team. In this paper, we provide an analysis of a
single case in order to compare the relative merits of two methods recently proposed
in AI and Law: a method using Bayesian networks with embedded scenarios, and
a method using case models that provide a formal analysis of argument validity. To
optimise the transparency of the two analyses, we have selected a case about which
the ﬁnal decision is undisputed. The two analyses allow us to provide a comparative
evaluation showing strengths and weaknesses of the two methods. We ﬁnd a core
of evidential reasoning that is shared between the methods.
Keywords. Bayesian networks, case models
1. Introduction
Reasoning with evidence is difﬁcult. This is especially pertinent in court, where reason-
ing correctly about evidence can mean the difference between a rightful conviction, or a
wrongful imprisonment. To safeguard against errors, three tools for the rational analysis
have been investigated in the literature: argument-based, scenario-based, and probabilis-
tic [1,2,3,4]. In argumentative analyses, the emphasis is on argument structure, defeat
and evaluation [5,6,7,8,9]. In scenario methods, with roots in legal psychology, the em-
phasis is on the construction and comparison of coherent explanatory scenarios and their
relation to the evidence [10,11,12,13,14]. Probabilistic tools analyze how hypothetical
events are probabilistically related to the evidence and to evidential updating, in partic-
ular by using Bayesian networks [15,16]. Hybrid approaches investigate, for instance,
combinations of scenarios and arguments [17], evidential Bayesian networks [15,18,16],
scenarios and probabilities [19,20]. Comparative case studies for assessing the relative
merits of approaches are as yet rare. A recent valuable effort to this effect is the study
of the Simonshaven case using different methods (upcoming issue ‘Models of Ratio-
nal Proof in Criminal Law’ in the journal Topics in Cognitive Science, editors Henry
Prakken, Floris Bex and Anne Ruth Mackor).
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In this paper, two methods recently proposed in AI and Law are compared and eval-
uated: Bayesian networks with embedded scenarios [21], and case models that provide a
formal analysis of argument validity [22]. For this, we develop two analyses of a murder
case, one for each method. Since we are developing both analyses ourselves, we can aim
for optimal similarity, increasing comparability (in contrast with the analyses in Topics
in Cognitive Science, each developed by a separate team). The case is based on a real
case,1 simpliﬁed for present purposes. To improve transparency, we have selected a case
with undisputed conclusion:
On October ﬁrst, 2002, N, a 25-year-old student is found dead in her apartment. There are
signs of violence: bullet casings and blood. Before she died, she had called a friend. The
friend reported a normal conversation, then heard a ’good morning’, followed by yells and
loud sounds, before the call dropped. A suspect was soon identiﬁed: P, the son of the landlord,
who also lived in the apartment. He ﬂed to Poland before he could be apprehended, and was
only arrested in 2003. The court found P guilty of the murder of N in 2004.
2. Methods compared
2.1. Bayesian networks with embedded scenarios
A Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph with associated conditional probabilities,
and represents a joint probability distribution [24]. Bayesian networks can be used to
avoid common fallacies in probabilistic reasoning [25]. The probability distribution can
be found by elicitation techniques [26], although the lack of data makes objective priors
difﬁcult to ﬁnd [27].
Probabilistic tools and the scenario approach are combined in [21] to construct a
Bayesian network via scenario idioms. A scenario idiom consists of a boolean scenario
node, and child-nodes representing aspects of that scenario. When the scenario node is
true then all child-nodes must also be true. This ensures coherence, and transfer of ev-
idential support. In the method, mutually exclusive scenarios are modeled via a con-
straint node (see [28]). Child nodes can represent abstract aspects that a court needs to
prove, like motive or opportunity. Aspect nodes can be connected to other aspect nodes,
and must be supported by evidence nodes. Evidence nodes are conditional on the aspect
nodes.
2.2. Case Models
Case models are a formal tool for the analysis of coherent, presumptive and conclusive
arguments using a preference ordering of cases [22]. The formalism is inspired by the
connections between the three approaches to evidence. A case model can be constructed
by adding evidence piecewise (argumentative) to construct coherent hypotheses (scenar-
ios) of varying credibility (probabilistic).
A case model consists of a set of cases C, and their preference ordering ≤. Cases
combine hypothetical events and evidence. The preference ordering depends on the co-
herence, conclusiveness, and presumptive validity of the arguments [22] of the cases.
1Rechtbank Utrecht, see case ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2004:AO3150, also used in [23].
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Figure 1. The Bayesian network of the case. The dark grey nodes are the scenario nodes: links between the
scenario nodes and the aspect nodes are represented by dotted lines. The white nodes are the aspect nodes. The
light grey, small nodes are the evidence nodes.
3. Models
In the following section, the methods for creating the Bayesian network and the case
model are discussed.
3.1. Bayesian Networks
Following the method described by [21], two different scenarios of the case were con-
structed. The scenarios were modeled in a Bayesian network. The probability tables of
each node were determined. The different nodes were turned off and on to see how each
piece of evidence inﬂuences the probabilities in the scenario nodes.
3.1.1. Step 1: Create scenarios
Scenario 1 This scenario is based on the arguments of the prosecution. Suspect P mur-
dered victim N with a gun. P had a motive, he was angry about an earlier conﬂict. He also
had an illegal gun. N had been at home, on the phone with a friend. The friend testiﬁed
that she heard N greet someone, followed by the sounds of gunﬁre and screaming. This
greeting places P at the scene, as the other tenants had already left for work. After the
murder, P ﬂees in N’s car, leaving blood traces behind. He ﬂees to Poland. When he is
in Poland, he makes several phone calls to his parents. In these phone calls, he confesses
that he did something to N.
Scenario 2 This scenario is based on P’s testimony. In this scenario P has been kid-
napped, and he also has amnesia. P does not remember killing N, or where he was the
morning of the crime.
3.1.2. Step 2: Creating the nodes and connections of the Bayesian Network
The complete network structure is shown in Figure 1. This is a diagram representation of
the network that was created with GeNIe and AgenaRisk. The two scenario nodes were
implemented ﬁrst, connected by a constraint node.
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Table 1. The probability table for gun. Numbers are based on the base rate of gun ownership, 6% in the
Netherlands,3 and the (debatable) assumption that people with a motive are more likely to own a ﬁrearm.
Probability of having a gun
Scenario1 and Motive 0.2
Scenario1 and ¬Motive 0
¬Scenario1 and Motive 0.2
¬Scenario1 and ¬Motive 0.06
The aspect nodes for scenario 1 are: motive, which represents the motive of P,
supported by testimony of both his parents and N’s friends about the conﬂict; gun, which
represents the gun P had in his home, supported by the weapon being found, seen in
hallway, which places P at the scene, and is supported by N’s phone call with her friend.
These three nodes are parent nodes of murder with gun, which represents P’s murder
of N, and is supported by N’s body being found and signs of violence at the scene,
like blood traces and bullet shells. The murder with gun node has two child-nodes:
flees in car, representing how P ﬂees, supported by N’s car being found, which has
been used after she died, and had her blood in it, and confession to parents node,
representing P’s confession to his parents over the phone, supported by his phone call.
The node motive is also the parent of gun, as these are not two independent events: the
probability of having a gun is not independent of the probability of having a motive.
The nodes for scenario 2 are: the aspect node kidnapped, which represents
P’s kidnapping by unknown persons, which is supported by his testimony, evidence
node testimony P, but detracted by evidence node: no concrete evidence for
kidnapping, which represents that there is no concrete evidence, apart from P’s tes-
timony, that he was kidnapped. The aspect node amnesia, is supported by evidence
node P’s testimony, which represents P’s testimony that he doesn’t remember any-
thing, and the node medical investigation found no amnesia, which represents
the fact that there was no physical cause for amnesia as determined by a doctor.
3.1.3. Step 3: Creating the probability tables
Every node has an associated table, containing the probabilities of the node, conditioned
on the values of the parents. Table 1 shows the probability table for the gun node, which
depends on the value of the scenario node, and the motive node. The probabilities in the
nodes are based on subjective choices. The constraint node has a value of NA when it
was not the case that exactly one scenario was true.
3.1.4. Evidence ﬂow through the network
By turning the evidence nodes off and on, the cumulative effect of different pieces of
evidence on the probabilities of different scenarios is shown (Table 2). Presumption of
innocence was modeled by having the prior probability of the guilty scenario node set to
50%, and the prior probability of the non-guilty scenario set to 50%, following [27].
3.2. Case Models
A case model (Figure 3) is created through a visual exploration of evidence (Figure 2). In
this case study, evidence was collected from the court case. Then, the visual interpretation
was created, where evidence was added step-by-step (in the same order as the nodes
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Table 2. Rounded down cumulative evidence in nodes for scenario 1, guilty and scenario 2, not guilty, evidence
is turned on in the same order as evidence is added to the case model. The probability of one scenario does not
affect the probability of the other scenario if there are no nodes that belong to both scenarios.
Evidence P(Scenario 1) in % P(Scenario 2) in %
Start 50 50
Body found 43 56
Signs of violence 76 24
Weapon found 83 16
Phone call with friend 83 16
Testimony kidnapping 75 24
Testimony amnesia 64 35
Car with bloodstains 75 25
Testimony conﬂict 75 25
No concrete evidence of kidnapping 96 4
Medical investigation found no amnesia 99 1
Phone call parents close to 100 close to 0
were turned on in (Table 2). From the visual interpretation, different hypotheses were
collected. The hypotheses were then joined with maximally coherent evidence in order
to create cases [22].
3.2.1. Step 1: Visual interpretation of the case model
A body is found. At this point, there is no evidence to assume a crime. However, there
are (signs of violence), including bullet wounds and a found gun (weapon found),
so the victim was murdered with a gun.
Except for the victim, P was the only person in the house, and he was heard on the
phone (phone call with friend), so he is a suspect, and either guilty, or not guilty.
P was then interviewed, and testiﬁed that he had been kidnapped, and that he had amne-
sia (testimony kidnapping), (testimony amnesia). The hypothesis of P not being
guilty is further subdivided: either he is not guilty and he is telling the truth about the
kidnapping and the amnesia, or he is not guilty and something else happened.
More evidence is added: N’s (car with bloodstains) was found, moved after she
was already dead, suggesting that P ﬂed in her car. N’s parents also testiﬁed about a
conﬂict between P and N, which offers a motive (testimony conflict). P’s testimony
conﬂicts with the results of a (medical examination), which shows no physical cause
for amnesia, as well as (no concrete evidence) of any kidnapping. The last piece of
evidence is (phone call parents), he confesses that he did something to N in a phone
call to his parents.
3.2.2. Step 2: Collect hypotheses
Every case in the case model has a hypothesis. This hypothesis can be found in the
columns of the case model. This case model has the following three hypotheses:
1. P is guilty
2. ¬P is guilty ∧ P was kidnapped (¬P∧K)
3. ¬P is guilty ∧ ¬P was kidnapped (¬P∧¬K)
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body found
murder signs of violence
victim murdered with gun weapon found
P is guilty ¬P is guilty phone call with friend
¬P∧K ¬P∧¬K testimony kidnapping,
testimony amnesia





confession to parents phone call parents
Figure 2. The case model creation, adding evidence chronologically
3.2.3. Step 3: Create cases by adding evidence to hypotheses
To create the cases, each hypothesis is extended with the subset of evidence that is
coherent with the hypothesis. The evidence that is common to all three hypotheses:
body found ∧ signs of violence ∧ weapon found ∧ phone call with friend,
is represented in these cases by E, for conciseness. There are 7 cases in total, shown in
Figure 3.
1. P is guilty ∧ murder ∧ victim murdered with gun ∧ P fled in N’s car
∧ motive ∧ conflicting testimony ∧ confession to parents
∧ E ∧ testimony kidnapping ∧ testimony amnesia ∧ car with bloodstains
∧ testimony conflict ∧ no concrete evidence ∧ medical examination
∧ phone call parents.
2. ¬P is guilty ∧ P was kidnapped ∧ murder ∧ victim murdered with gun
∧ E ∧ testimony kidnapping ∧ testimony amnesia ∧ ¬ car with bloodstains.
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Figure 3. The ﬁnal case model creation
3. ¬P is guilty ∧ P was kidnapped ∧ murder ∧ victim murdered with gun
∧ E ∧ testimony kidnapping ∧ testimony amnesia ∧ car with bloodstains
∧ ¬ testimony conflict .
4. ¬P is guilty ∧ P was kidnapped ∧ murder ∧ victim murdered with gun
∧ E ∧ testimony kidnapping ∧ testimony amnesia ∧ car with bloodstains
∧ testimony conflict.
5. ¬P is guilty ∧ ¬P was kidnapped ∧ murder ∧ victim murdered with gun
∧ E ∧ testimony kidnapping ∧ testimony amnesia ∧ ¬ car with bloodstains.
6. ¬P is guilty ∧ ¬P was kidnapped ∧ murder ∧ victim murdered with gun
∧ E ∧ testimony kidnapping ∧ testimony amnesia ∧ car with bloodstains
∧ testimony conflict ∧ ¬ no concrete evidence ∧ ¬ medical examination.
7. ¬P is guilty ∧ ¬P was kidnapped ∧ murder ∧ victim murdered with gun
∧ E ∧ testimony kidnapping ∧ testimony amnesia ∧ car with bloodstains
∧ testimony conflict ∧ no concrete evidence ∧ medical examination.
The preference ordering is, as represented by the areas of the different boxes: 1 > 2 ∼ 4
∼ 5 ∼ 7 > 3 ∼ 6.
The arguments (T, body found) and (T, body found ∧ signs of violence) are
coherent, conclusive and presumptively valid, as everyone agrees that a body was found,
and violence was committed.
The argument (body found ∧ signs of violence ∧ testimony conflict,
P is guilty) is presumptively valid and coherent, but not conclusive, as (body found
∧ signs of violence ∧ testimony conflict, ¬P is guilty ∧ P was kidnapped
) is also coherent.
The argument (body found ∧ signs of violence ∧ weapon found ∧
phone call with friend ∧ testimony kidnapping ∧ testimony amnesia ∧
car with bloodstains ∧ testimony conflict ∧ no concrete evidence ∧
medical examination ∧ phone call parents, P is guilty) is coherent, conclu-
sive, and presumably valid.
4. Comparative evaluation
We have provided two analyses of one case using very different formal methods. Also of
the Simonshaven case, both a Bayesian network [27] (but not with embedded scenarios
as we did here, following [21]) and a case model [29] were made. However, as these
were prepared by separate authors, these analyses are based on rather different selections
of what is modeled about the case and how. Here we have aimed to optimise similarity
between the two models in order to allow for a more speciﬁc comparative evaluation.
Also the Simonshaven case can be considered as a ‘hard case’ with a disputable outcome,
whereas we selected a case with an undisputed outcome.
The Bayesian network with embedded scenarios (the BNS model) consists of a di-
rected acyclic graph (with associated conditional probability tables) modeling the evi-
dence/events and their probabilistic dependencies. In contrast, the case model (CM) con-
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sists of sentences and a preference ordering modeling coherent combinations of evidence
and hypothetical events. The ordering models comparative credibility of the cases and
can be given a probabilistic interpretation. The two models hence provide very different
ways to connect qualitative and quantitative modeling styles.
The two analyses provide a perspective on the stepwise inﬂuence of the evidence
that is well aligned, as can be seen by comparing Table 2 and Figure 2. The design of the
CM model (representing the stepwise construction of a theory about the case) inﬂuenced
the choice of numbers for the BNS model, thereby optimizing the alignment.
The BNS model allows ﬁne-grained numeric estimates of relevance and strength,
where the CM model uses a cruder ordering. The effects of numeric propagation in the
BN model are not easy to predict and interpret (cf. the inﬂuence of the CM model on the
BNS model). For both methods, it is not obvious how to choose differences (numbers
and ordering, respectively).
Both the BNS and the CM model can model conﬂicts of the evidence. In the BNS
model, adding evidence can have a positive or negative effect on the probability of a
scenario, and in the CM model evidence can match and exclude hypothetical scenarios.
The coherent clustering of events in scenarios is modeled in the BNS model using
scenario nodes and constraint nodes (cf. [28]). In the CM model, clusters of evidence
with scenarios are modeled by mutually exclusive cases.
The scenario nodes add to the explanation of the BNS model. Also turning evidence
on and off (as in a BN software tool) helps to uncover the inﬂuence of the evidence on hy-
potheses. However the meaning of results and how they come about is not always trans-
parent (why is an outcome 10%? why 50%?). The CM model’s construction (Figure 2)
allows for an explanation that as said could support alignment with Table 2. The ﬁnal
decision in the model has a transparent explanation, but the choice of ordering remains
an issue.
For justifying a decision, the BNS model allows for a choice after picking a threshold
posterior probability (e.g., 95%), providing a clean and precise model of justiﬁcation.
However, there is no obvious choice of threshold. In the CM model, justiﬁcation of a
decision has the form of coherence after exclusion of all alternatives considered. For
both, the question remains whether there are unconsidered, unmodeled alternatives that
could change the decision.
On ease of modeling, choosing dependencies and numbers for the BNS model was
not easy, but once built, the role of the evidence on the hypothetical outcomes can be
directly tested. The CM model was easy to construct. It seems positive that indeed con-
sistency with the probabilistic BNS model was possible (as suggested by the theoretical
fact that CM models allow for a numeric, probabilistic interpretation). At the same time,
it is not clear whether the focus on only an ordering in the CM model reduces the expres-
siveness allowed by a BNS model, where subtle interaction effects can be modeled.
5. Summary and conclusion
Both Bayesian networks with embedded scenarios and case models can be used as hybrid
tools to combine probabilistic, scenario and argumentation approaches to investigating
hypotheses and evidence. In this paper, we have analyzed one case (with an undisputed
outcome) using these two methods aiming for optimal similarity by using comparable
modeling elements.
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Evidence in Bayesian networks is relevant across the whole network, have a precise
interpretation of evidence strength, and are straightforward in their use, once they have
been created. Relations between different pieces of evidence is done by making subjec-
tive probabilities explicit, and truth is decided based on threshold probabilities. Coher-
ence is not an inherent feature to Bayesian networks. Modelling a Bayesian network and
deciding on the probabilities is a challenge.
In case models, evidence can be more local, conﬁned to relevant cases. How to in-
clude quantitative data using only the ordering of cases is not clear. Coherence is inher-
ent, and justiﬁcation and explanation seem more similar to human reasoning than the
conditional probabilities of the Bayesian network. Modelling a case model visually is
straightforward, although extracting the cases and the ordering is not.
Both methods have limitations: the subjective probability assessment, especially in
combination with nodes with a large probability table (nodes with many parents), is a
problem in Bayesian networks. Coherency is similarly subjective, as well as the lack of
expression of evidence strength in case models. However, both methods might help re-
solve inconsistent or incorrect reasoning with evidence by guiding the reasoners to con-
sider conﬂicting pieces of evidence and overall coherence of each hypothesis or scenario.
We saw that the evidential progression modeled in two different ways (Table 2,
Figure 2) could be well aligned, suggesting that such reasoning provides a shared core
of evidential reasoning in the different methods. That progression is also at the heart of
the modeling style in [25].
Reliable probability elicitation methods [26] are needed for the proper use of
Bayesian networks. However, as the probabilities needed are often unobservable, giv-
ing appropriate probabilistic assessments can be very difﬁcult. One idea to improve the
understanding of probabilistic assessments would be to create a multi-agent simulation,
with certain known incidences of different crimes. Then, different ranges of probabili-
ties, based on those in this simulation, can be used in Bayesian networks to test different
scenarios inside these worlds.
The case model theory does not exclude the possibility of quantiﬁcation. However,
it is unclear how this would work in practise: would this mean that every part of the case
model is quantiﬁed, or can there be a mixed approach? Modelling a case that is more
reliant on statistical inferences (for example, with DNA evidence), would be useful in
ﬁnding the limitations of quantiﬁcation in case models.
A useful, stricter evaluation of the methods could come from a systematic compara-
tive analysis of other cases, more complex than the present one, like in the Simonshaven
case studies, but then with carefully guarded model similarity.
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